

Summer 2019

Capital Markets: Observations and Insights Reframing Risk

Reframing Risk

“The word ‘risk’ derives from the early Italian *risicare*, which means ‘to dare.’ In this sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate.” – Peter L. Bernstein

At Alger we think about risk somewhat differently. For most the primary measures of risk are statistically accepted metrics such as downside capture, beta, and standard deviation. While we monitor those metrics, we believe they are an imperfect shorthand intended to capture fundamental risk.

To us, risk is the chance of loss. In such a rapidly changing world, that could be the risk of getting disrupted as innovation strikes. In that sense statistically cheap stocks may not provide investors with protection. Even historically less volatile stocks, such as consumer staples, are proving to be more prone to risk than conventional measures would suggest. In our view, it is a mistake to think of risk only in the context of the economic cycle as we have seen time and time again that innovation is often more powerful. We believe those companies benefitting from change will serve to mitigate investor risk while those on the losing side are likely to create undue risk, particularly in a weak economy.

We believe that understanding how innovation and change are likely to play out is the best risk mitigation tool.



Daniel C. Chung, CFA
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Investment Officer



Brad Neuman, CFA
Senior Vice President
Director of Market Strategy

Key Observations and Themes

Page 3

Reframing Risk

Traditionally accepted metrics are part of an imperfect shorthand intended to capture fundamental risk. We believe risk should be evaluated in the context of fundamental durability.

Page 10

Younger than It Looks

While the economic expansion is chronologically old, many metrics are closer to middle age than senior. We believe the end of the expansion is not imminent.

Page 14

Style Divergence

Powerful structural forces are causing Growth to diverge from Value. Investors looking for a reversion to the mean may be disappointed.

Page 17

Accelerating Innovation

Innovation is speeding up and changing the way the economy behaves, increasingly driving stock performance.

Page 21

The Search for Yield

Falling interest rates are driving investors to seek out yield, even in equities.

Page 24

Additional Insights

A framework for forecasting future stock returns and more.

Reframing Risk


The Downside of Downside Capture

- Low downside capture is thought to reduce risk, but over reasonably long periods, strong secular growth can provide superior returns, *even in down markets*


Low Downside Capture Can Underperform Secular Growth in Both Bull and Bear Markets

● Annual Return ■ Downside Capture

Performance During Bull Market
(3 years ended 6/30/2019)



Performance During Bear Market
(3 years ended 12/31/2009)




Source: FactSet. The figures presented are provided for illustrative purposes. They include examples of the performance of two industries with downside captures above and below 100%, respectively. Examples of such performance during a bull market and bear market are provided. Please note that using different industries or different time periods might have materially different results than those shown above. **The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.**


Reframing Risk Beyond Beta

- Beta is thought to be a good measure of risk but in practice it is backward looking in nature, making it a poor measure of potential losses
 - At the tech bubble peak, the beta of technology stocks was less than one; the same was true of financials in early 2008 prior to the Global Financial Crisis

Below Market Risk at Height of Tech Bubble?



Below Market Risk Preceding the Mortgage Meltdown?




Source: FactSet. Beta calculated relative to S&P 500 on 12-month trailing basis. **The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.**

Reframing Risk

Passive Problems?

- The vast majority of passive investing allows relative performance to drive relative weighting changes, irrespective of fundamentals
 - This can exacerbate problems such as in Tech in the late 1990s or in Financials prior to the Global Financial Crisis


Passive Proves Problematic at Points



Reframing Risk

Fundamentals vs. Valuation

- Instead of using statistics, investors should think of risk as the chance of loss or the probability that the bear case comes to fruition
- But what is more important when assessing risk—fundamentals or valuation?





Reframing Risk

Not All Fundamentals Are Created Equally

- Understanding the downside to sales, earnings, and cash flows in a difficult economic environment is key to understanding risk in portfolios
 - Value stocks have often acted like sailboats that depend on the wind of economic activity, while Growth stocks enjoy a secular motor to help protect against volatility


Look for Stocks Where Fundamentals May Prove Resilient



Reframing Risk

Beating Economic Volatility?

- Innovation can triumph over economic volatility
 - History shows that there are areas of innovation and growth throughout recessions, depressions, and panics over the past 150 years*
 - This may be why Growth stock fundamentals have held up better in recessions




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, PwC, Census Bureau. *See Alger's white paper "The Enduring Force of Innovation."

Reframing Risk

Focusing on Fundamentals

- When it comes to areas of innovation, fundamentals prove more important than valuation metrics




Source: FactSet for the three-year period ended 6/30/19, based on GICS industries of the S&P 1500 Index.

Younger than It Looks

Cycles Have Been Lasting Longer

- U.S. economic expansions have been increasing in duration. Driving factors include:
 - Increased fiscal and monetary intervention (e.g., tax cuts/spending and assertive Fed)
 - Structural changes in the economy (e.g., larger proportion of services)
 - Technological advances (e.g., improved inventory management)




Source: FactSet and Alger. Note: double-dip recession in early 1980s accounted for as one recession.

Younger than It Looks

Cyclical Spending Signals More Expansion


- The cyclical components of GDP – business investment, residential investment, and consumer durables – have historically risen much higher prior to economic peaks
- The implication is that the economic expansion has room to expand



Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Younger than It Looks Low Debt Burden

- Despite higher levels of debt as a % of GDP, the U.S. non-financial private sector debt service ratio is much lower than in the past two recessions
 - Because more than 80% of U.S. consumer and business debt is fixed, higher interest rates would not have a dramatic impact on service costs




Source: Bank for International Settlements, June 2019. Debt Service Ratio is the share of income used for interest payments and amortizations in the non-financial private sector. Shaded regions indicate recessions.

Younger than It Looks

Follow The Leader

- The Leading Economic Index is a good indicator of future economic growth or lack thereof
- Historically, it has declined on a year-over-year basis leading up to a recession
- Currently, it is rising, indicating continued economic growth, albeit at a slower pace




Source: The Conference Board and Alger analysis as of June 2019.

Style Divergence

Structural Issues Driving Growth vs. Value

- Growth stocks have dramatically outperformed (>30%) Value stocks over the past decade
- The driver has been the very weak performance of the valuation metric Price-to-Book, which is used heavily in index classifications of Growth vs. Value stocks
- As accounting fails to keep up with the changing economy, book value may no longer be as relevant (e.g., R&D is not capitalized in book value)



Source: FactSet as of 6/30/19. Low price-to-book returns are based on the B/P Northfield factor for the Northfield broad U.S. market database. **The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.**

Style Divergence

The Growth Advantage

- Three variables drive P/E multiples: growth, return on capital, and risk
- As compared to the Russell 1000 Value Index, the Russell 1000 Growth Index has higher expected EPS growth, higher return on equity, and lower risk in the form of better balance sheets

Stronger Growth

■ R1000G ■ R1000V

14.3%

8.3%

Long-Term EPS Growth

Higher Returns

■ R1000G ■ R1000V

30.9%

12.1%

Return on Equity

Lower Risk

■ R1000G ■ R1000V

1.0x

2.7x

Net Debt / EBITDA

Source: FactSet as of 6/30/19. Growth represents consensus long-term analyst estimates and actual future EPS growth rates might be materially different than the forecasts shown.


Style Divergence

Growth and Value Near Equilibrium


- Despite their outperformance over the past several years, Growth stocks are not very expensive compared to their Value equity counterparts relative to expected growth rates or history

Russell 1000 Growth vs. Russell 1000 Value PEG Ratio
(P/E Divided by Long-Term Growth Rate)

Growth stocks are cheaper relative to long-term growth



Russell 1000 Growth Relative to Russell 1000 Value P/E




Source: FactSet, Bank of America as of 6/30/19. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

Accelerating Innovation


Stepping on the Gas

- Research has shown that innovation is accelerating across many areas of the economy
- As a result new products and services are diffusing through society faster, disrupting businesses at a greater pace

Years from Market Entry to 50% Penetration



Years to Reach 1 Billion Users




Source: Asymco, Visual Capitalist, company disclosures.

Accelerating Innovation

A New, More Powerful Driver of Disruption

- Moore’s Law, the doubling of transistors on a microchip every two years, has been the driving force of the global digital revolution
- Now a new exponential law for artificial intelligence (AI) is set to usher in even larger, more powerful changes in technology and living standards




AI program training doubling every 3 to 5 months

Source: OpenAI.

Accelerating Innovation

Innovation Deflation

- While low unemployment should indicate inflation pressures, we believe innovation in the form of pricing transparency, new business models, and automation is driving down inflation
 - An indication of this dynamic is the declining correlation of wages and inflation




Source: Alger analysis, U.S. Bureau of Economic Statistics, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Wages are year-over-year change in unit labor costs and inflation is year-over-year change in PCE price deflator ex-food & energy.

Accelerating Innovation

Innovation as Wealth Creator

- Studies have shown and our research demonstrates that the most innovative companies grow their sales, earnings, and stock prices faster*




Source: FactSet. Most/least innovative stock excess performance is derived from highest and lowest S&P 1500 quintiles based on R&D as % of sales, normalized for market value, using one month returns for 10 years ending 4/30/19. *Baruch Lev and Suresh Radhakrishnan, "The Stock Market Valuation of R&D Leaders." **The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.**

The Search for Yield

Paying to Lend


- Weakening global economic activity due in part to the trade war along with secularly low inflation has weighed on interest rates, driving record negative yielding debt



The Search for Yield

Stocks Are Cheap Relative to Bonds

- Historically, the “earnings yield” of equities (inverse of the P/E) has been just modestly above 10-year Treasury yields
- Since the Global Financial Crisis, however, that spread has widened out and has yet to normalize, making equities attractive relative to bonds




Source: FactSet, Federal Reserve, and S&P, as of 6/30/19.

The Search for Yield

Bond-like Equities Are in Favor


- Low interest rates are driving bond-like equity sectors to trade at premiums to their historical valuations while health care appears inexpensive due in part to political issues



Source: FactSet and UBS, based on S&P 500 Index as of 6/30/19. The Communication Services, Consumer Discretionary, and Technology sectors' historical data have been restated to reflect September 2018 changes to the GICS sector classifications. Note that Consumer Discretionary ex-Internet Retail is at a 3% premium to its 20-year median.

Additional Insights After the First Cut

- Historically, stocks have gone on to produce strong gains but have occasionally also experienced losses after the first Fed rate cut
- Down periods following cuts in 2001 and 2007 had the backdrop of the tech bubble and the global financial crisis, respectively, and therefore may be less analogous to the current situation
 - Today's environment, in terms of the economy and innovation, may resemble 1995 or 1998





Source: FactSet. Rate cuts occurred in June 1989, July 1995, September 1998, January 2001, and September 2007. **The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.**

Additional Insights

Smaller Capitalization Stocks Poised to Outperform

- **Stronger fundamentals:** Estimated small cap EPS growth for '19 & '20 is double that of large cap
- **Compelling valuation:** Small cap P/E multiple premium is low relative to history
- **More levered to domestic economy:** U.S. small caps have less exposure to international economies




Source: FactSet as of June 2019. EPS for 2019-2020 are consensus estimates and actual earnings per share might be materially different than shown.

Additional Insights

Productivity Is Improving


- A year and a half ago we called for an acceleration in productivity
- Today productivity is improving, which drives higher sustainable growth for the economy
- In our view, productivity should continue to accelerate based on robust innovation and solid business spending



Additional Insights

Election by the Numbers

- Over the past half century in presidential elections involving incumbents, a strong correlation has existed between disposable income growth and percentage of votes won
- Historically, disposable income growth of nearly 2% has been needed for re-election, which is currently where it is running





Source: Strategas and Alger. Historical income growth is December to October of election year, annualized, while current data point is YoY growth for May 2019.

Additional Insights

Framework for Forecasting Returns

- There is a strong relationship between starting valuations and ensuing 10-year returns
- Current valuations suggest equities should produce returns lower than their historical average, but materially outperform bonds over the coming decade

■ = Month ● = Current



Source: FactSet. Each dot represents the P/E during that month and the returns generated over the subsequent 10 years. The starting P/E ratio is the price divided by the next 12-month earnings per share estimate at the start of each 10-year period measured. Monthly data through June 2019 and beginning in January 1986 (S&P 500) and December 1978 (Russell 1000 Growth). The tech bubble, represented by the 10-year returns beginning in April 1987-March 1990 and ending in April 1997-March 2000 skewed the regression by resulting in higher returns for given valuations than the historical relationship would imply. **The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.**

Disclosure

The views expressed are the views of Fred Alger Management, Inc. and Alger Management Ltd. (together with their affiliated entities “Alger”) as of June 2019. Alger has used sources of information which it believes to be reliable; however, this publication is not intended to be and does not constitute investment advice. These views are subject to change at any time and they do not guarantee the future performance of the markets, any security, or any funds managed by Alger.

Risk Disclosures: Investing in the stock market involves certain risks, and may not be suitable for all investors. Growth stocks tend to be more volatile than other stocks as their prices tend to be higher in relation to their companies’ earnings and may be more sensitive to market, political, and economic developments. **Past performance is not indicative of future performance.** Investors whose reference currency differs from that in which the underlying assets are invested may be subject to exchange rate movements that alter the value of their investments.

Important Information for US Investors: This material must be accompanied by the most recent fund fact sheet(s) if used in connection with the sale of mutual fund shares. Fred Alger & Company, Incorporated serves as distributor of the Alger mutual funds.

Important Information for UK Investors: The distribution of this material in the United Kingdom is restricted by law. Accordingly, this material is provided only for and is directed only at persons in the United Kingdom reasonably believed to be of a kind to whom such promotions may be communicated by an unauthorized person pursuant to an exemption under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “FPO”). Such persons include: (a) persons having professional experience in matters relating to investments and (b) high net worth bodies corporate, partnerships, unincorporated associations, trusts, etc. falling within Article 49 of the FPO. Most of the rules made under the FSMA for the protection of retail clients do not apply, and compensation under the United Kingdom Financial Services Compensation Scheme will not be available.

Important Information for UK and EU Investors: This material is directed at investment professionals and qualified investors (as defined by MiFID/FCA regulations). It is for information purposes only and has been prepared and is made available for the benefit investors. This material does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which it is not authorised or permitted, or to anyone who would be an unlawful recipient, and is only intended for use by original recipients and addressees. The original recipient is solely responsible for any actions in further distributing this material and should be satisfied in doing so that there is no breach of local legislation or regulation.

Certain products may be subject to restrictions with regard to certain persons or in certain countries under national regulations applicable to such persons or countries.

Alger Management, Ltd. (company house number 8634056, domiciled at 78 Brook Street, London W1K 5EF, UK) is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, for the distribution of regulated financial products and services. FAM and/or Weatherbie Capital, LLC, U.S. registered investment advisors, serve as sub-portfolio manager to financial products distributed by Alger Management, Ltd.

Fred Alger & Company, Incorporated is not an authorized person for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 of the United Kingdom (“FSMA”) and this material has not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21(2)(b) of the FSMA.

Disclosure

The S&P 500 Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of the U.S. stock market without regard to company size. The S&P Composite 1500 is an unmanaged index that covers approximately 90% of the U.S. market capitalization. The Russell 1000® Growth Index is an unmanaged index designed to measure the performance of the largest 1000 companies in the Russell 3000 Index with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 1000 Value Index measures the performance of those Russell 1000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell 2000 Growth Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of common stocks designed to track performance of small-capitalization companies with greater than average growth orientation. The Russell 2000 Value Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of the small-cap value segment of the U.S. equity universe and measures the performance of Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell 3000® Growth Index is an unmanaged index designed to measure the performance of those Russell 3000® Index companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 3000 Value Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of stocks from the Russell 3000 Index with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth rates. The index covers approximately 85% of the global equity opportunity set outside the US. The indices presented are provided for illustrative purposes, reflect the reinvestment of dividends and do not assess fees and expenses that would have the effect of reducing returns. Investors cannot invest directly in any index. The index performance does not represent the returns of any portfolio advised by Fred Alger Management, Inc. and actual client results might differ materially than the indices shown. Note that past performance is no guarantee of future results. Comparison to a different index might have materially different results than those shown.

Frank Russell Company (“Russell”) is the source and owner of the trademarks, service marks and copyrights related to the Russell Indexes. Russell® is a trademark of Frank Russell Company. Neither Russell nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the Russell Indexes and / or Russell ratings or underlying data and no party may rely on any Russell Indexes and / or Russell ratings and / or underlying data contained in this communication. No further distribution of Russell Data is permitted without Russell’s express written consent. Russell does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication.

ALCAPRESSPR-0619